Cutting one's coat according to one's cloth How did the great recession affect retirement resources and expenditure goals?

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November 2016

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 - \rightarrow 65+ poverty rate of 2% (OECD, 2015)
- Mandatory DB occupational pensions
 - → Over 90% of employees enrolled
- Other private pensions & private savings/housing wealth
- Net replacement rate 95.7% (OECD average: 63.2%, OECD, 2015)
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 - ightarrow Increase eligibility age for public pensions (67 in 2021, then linked to life expectancy)
 - → Restrictions on tax exempt private pension accumulation
- Private pension funds financially unfit
 - → Cuts in accrued rights (on average 7.3% in real terms)
- Reduced ability to compensate with private assets
 - → Disappointing returns
 - → Large decline in housing prices
- Unanticipated decline in pension wealth
 - 2007: 7 pension funds had reserve deficit; average coverage 144%
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How do people react to unanticipated wealth shocks?

Adapt expectations

- Banks et al. (2012): expected bequests tied to housing wealth
- Bissonnette and van Soest (2015): pension expectations more pessimistic between 2009-2012
- Adapt current behavior
 - Christelis et al. (2015): 0.6% drop in HH expenditures for 10% loss in housing wealth
- Adapt plans for future behavior
 - Delay planned retirement age?
 - Plan for lower future consumption? ← this paper

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Research question and contributions

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 - What is the effect of an unanticipated wealth shock on pension expenditure goals?
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 - Previous research investigated current consumption, retirement age, expectations regarding bequest
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Roadmap

- Introduction
- 2 Empirical approach
- 3 Data
- Results
- Conclusion

Empirical strategy

1. Overall changes

- Aim: show how wealth and consumption floors changed
- Problem: incomplete data linkage and selective non-response in 2008
- Solution:
 - Perform SUR on consumption floors and annuities in both years
 - Use estimates to simulate consumption floors and annuities

2. Changes at group level

- Aim: investigate whether groups that were hit also revised goals
- How: compare differences in SUR estimates for 2014 and 2008 for annuities and consumption floors

3. Individual-level longitudinal changes

- Aim: differentiate between effect of individual wealth decline or overall worsening of expectations
- How: fixed effects on overlapping sample



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Combining survey data with administrative records

- Survey data: LISS panel (CentER Data)
 - Representative for Dutch population
 - Pension goals elicited in 2008 and 2014
 - Information on non-taxed private pension entitlements
 - Background variables: employment, marital status, age etc.
- Administrative data (Statistics Netherlands)
 - Public pension entitlements (2008, 2012, provided by SVB)
 - Occupational pension entitlements (2008, 2012, provided by pension funds)
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Eliciting retirement consumption floors

Survey question:

What is the minimal level of monthly spending that you would never want to fall below during retirement, at all costs? Please think of all your expenditures, such as food, clothing, housing, insurance, etc. (Binswanger & Schunk, 2012)

- 2008 IQR: 56%-90% of current income (De Bresser & Knoef, 2015)
- People find the question difficult, but give consistent answers
 - Young vs. old
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
Descriptive statistics

	year	N	Mean	SD	p25	Mdn	p75	
a. Self-assessed minimum retirement expenditures								
Minimum monthly expenditures	2008	1,396	1,744	733	1,218	1,625	2,031	
	2014	2,755	1,495	570	1,095	1,460	1,825	
Min. exp./current income (%)	2008	1,396	76	28	57	75	91	
	2014	2,717	67	29	47	63	80	
b. Annuities								
Pensions	2008	900	2,163	728	1,649	2,122	2,551	
	2014	3,646	1,747	748	1,343	1,675	2,072	
Pensions + wealth	2008	890	2,393	955	1,795	2,262	2,790	
	2014	3,429	2,062	1,437	1,473	1,847	2,357	
Pensions + wealth + housing	2008	890	3,267	1,630	2,263	3,119	3,924	
	2014	3,429	2,740	1,936	1,703	2,423	3,207	


Amounts are equivalized to a one-person household and denoted in 2014 euros.

Results 1: overall changes


Figure: Fraction of population with annuity < consumption floor




Results 2: changes at group level



Results 2: changes at group level (cntd.)



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Results 3: individual-level longitudinal changes

	Dep. variable: consumption floor			
Annuity from pensions	0.374*** (0.102)	0.341*** (0.113)	-0.139 (0.195)	
Annuity from real estate	0.0390 (0.0399)	0.0730 (0.0472)	0.0282 (0.0353)	
Dummy 2014	,		-0.181*** (0.0494)	
Other controls	No	Yes	Yes	
Within R-squared	0.08	0.24		
number HHs	1,295	1,278	1,278	
n (individuals)	1,552	1,531	1,531	
N (total obs.)	1,727	1,703	1,703	

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Work in progress

- How can we get most out of the data, given the small amount of overlap in waves?
- Sensitivity analysis including variable describing income expectations

Error correlations

	Annuity 2008	Min exp. men 2008	Min exp. women 2008	Selection (annuity 2008)	Annuity 2014	Min exp. men 2014	Min exp. women 2014
a. Annuities from pension	s						
Annuity 2008	1						
Min exp. men 2008	0.207***	1					
Min exp. women 2008	0.222***	0.479***	1				
Selection (annuity 2008)	0.165	-0.036	-0.071	1			
Annuity 2014	0.598***	0.059	0.075	0.205***	1		
Min exp. men 2014	0.160***	0.359***	0.020	0.111*	0.155***	1	
Min exp. women 2014	0.115**	0.202**	0.366***	0.099	0.151***	0.506***	1

^{*}significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%